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Abstract
T h i sp a p e rp r o p o s e sa na n a l y s i so fb o t hd o c t o r sa n dp a t i e n t s ’b e h a v i o ri na n
agency model that accounts for the interplay between two highly debated health
issues: drug advertising toward doctors and/or patients, and the serious problem
of patients’ noncompliance with their doctors’ prescriptions. Due to the lack of
individual data, we adopt a structural approach inspired from the industrial orga-
nization literature. The model is estimated semiparametrically with product level
data on the U.S. market for anti-glaucoma drugs. The results show that doctors’
prescriptions are directly inﬂuenced by the probability of noncompliance, as well
as advertising aimed at both doctors and patients. Advertisement toward patients
(respectively, doctors) contributed to (respectively, slowed down) the reduction of
the estimated average noncompliance rate.
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In 1997, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) simpliﬁed the information requirements for
direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of prescription drugs. The FDA’s decision contributed
to a sharp increase in the spending on DTCA (from $624 million in 1996 to $1.3 billion in
1998).1 This sudden intensiﬁcation of DTCA fueled the controversy pertaining to the eﬀects
of advertisement on the doctor-patient relationship. At the same time, concerns have grown
in the medical profession about high rates of patient noncompliance with prescriptions drug
regimens.2 As further explained, noncompliance is clearly a serious problem: a recent study
indicates that 70% of patients do not comply with drug prescriptions, resulting in annual losses
of $170 billions in the U.S. (Dezii 2000).3 As we shall see, although it has been recognized
by health professionals, and in particular the FDA, the connection between advertising and
prescription noncompliance has been ignored in the economics literature.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the prescription and compliance behaviors of respectively
doctors and patients, in an agency model that accounts for the interplay between patient
noncompliance, direct-to-consumer advertising, and drug promotion toward doctors.4 More
speciﬁcally, our goal is to address the following two questions:
(i) How does advertisement and the probability of noncompliance aﬀect the doctor’s pre-
1These ﬁgures are for the entire pharmaceutical industry. See Holmer (1999) and The National Institute for
Health Care Management (2000).
2Compliance is deﬁned in the medical literature as “the extent to which a person’s behavior coincides with
medical or health advice” (Bentley 1999). In this paper, we adopt the deﬁnition used in Ellikson, Stern and
Trajtenberg (2000): a patient is said to be noncompliant with his doctor’s prescription if either he does not
buy the drug (“purchase noncompliance”), or he does not consume the drug in accordance to the doctor’s
prescription (“use noncompliance”). Noncompliance is, therefore, assumed to be a binary variable.
3These losses are generated for instance by unnecessary medical expenses (e.g. additional hospitalizations,
admissions in nursing home) and lost productivity.
4An agency problem arises when a principal (the patient) hires an agent (the doctor) to perform a task on
his behalf, but the goals of the two parties diﬀer.
2scription behavior?
(ii) How does drug promotion to doctors and/or patients inﬂuence the rate of noncompliance
with medication prescription in a given therapeutic class?
The relevance and actuality of these questions may be demonstrated by the public inquiry
recently launched by the FDA to determine the beneﬁts and drawbacks of prescription adver-
tisement.5 Indeed, the FDA, which is contemplating whether or not to regulate further DTCA,
speciﬁcally asked about the empirical eﬀect of DTCA on prescription habits, and patient non-
compliance. In other words, the answers to the questions raised in the present paper may have
important consequences, both from an economic and health perspective.
To address these issues however, one cannot estimate a reduced form econometric model
due to the current lack of accessible individual data, both at the drug and patient levels, and
to the lack of reliable noncompliance data by drug for a speciﬁc therapeutic class. Instead, we
adopt a structural approach, inspired from the industrial organization literature (Berry 1994,
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995), to estimate the model from market level data. It has to
be noted, however, that, drawing extensively from the medical literature on the determinants
on noncompliance, we strived to impose just enough structure to enable the estimation of the
model from the available data. In particular, the probability of noncompliance with a drug
will be estimated semiparametrically.
To explain the doctor-patient relationship, we therefore develop a two-period agency model
in the setting of discrete choice theory. In period 1, the doctor prescribes a drug to treat the
patient from a ﬁnite set of alternative drugs. In period 2, the patient decides whether to comply
5Docket 02N-0209 submitted in may 2002. Details and replies to this public inquiry are available on the
FDA website at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/dockets.htm.
3with this prescription. The patient’s choice is assumed to be a rational trade-oﬀ between health
beneﬁts, and monetary as well as non-monetary costs associated with drug consumption (e.g.
side eﬀects, complexity of dosage schedule). The doctor’s decision to prescribe a given drug
is inﬂuenced, in particular, by his expectations of patient noncompliance. Finally, targeted
advertisements toward doctors and/or patients inﬂuence the decisions of both agents.
This theoretical model is then structurally estimated using a combination of IMS and CMR
product-level data on the U.S. market for anti-glaucoma drugs.6 The data set spans the period
1995 to 1999 and, therefore, it covers the 1997 FDA decision on DTCA. The empirical analysis
combines the techniques from semiparametric index models (Ichimura and Lee 1991, Ichimura
1993) and nonparametric models with endogenous variables (Newey, Powell and Vella 1999,
Blundell and Powell 2000).
We ﬁnd that advertisement for a given drug both toward doctors and patients increases
the probability that it will be prescribed. Doctors are also sensitive to prices and anticipated
noncompliance when they prescribe a drug. The results also suggest that the average non-
compliance rate with anti-glaucoma drugs has been considerably reduced between 1995 and
1999. We show that this reduction may well be the net eﬀect of two opposite forces: DTCA
appears to have decreased noncompliance, whereas promotion to doctors may have contributed
to increase the average noncompliance rate.
In the next section, we provide a review of the related literature, along with a brief back-
ground on the relationship between advertisement and noncompliance. In Section 3, we present
the model and its theoretical implications. Section 4, describes the estimation strategy and
the empirical results.
6IMS Health an CMR are two private market research companies, and major sources of information on the
health care and advertising industries.
42. Background and Related literature
2.1. Agency Problems in Health Care
The agency literature in health care focuses on the conﬂicts of interest that may arise between
doctors and patients under diverse institutional constraints.7 S e v e r a lm o d e l so fi n f o r m a t i o n
asymmetry between doctors and patients have been developed. For instance, Ellis and McGuire
(1990) model the interaction between doctors and patients as a non-cooperative game in which
the conﬂict is resolved using bargaining theory.
The models developed by Rochaix (1988), and Ellickson, Stern and Trajtenberg (2000)
(hereafter EST) are the closest to the one that we develop here. In Rochaix’s model, doctors
and patients agree on the diagnostic of illness, but hold diﬀerent views of its severity. EST
(2000) consider a similar approach but concentrate speciﬁcally on the noncompliance with
doctor’s drug prescription. The methodology in these papers is similar to the one we are
adopting: agents play a sequential game in which the doctor chooses ﬁrst the treatment and
its intensity, but she is uncertain about whether the patient will adhere to the treatment
recommendation.8 Neither Rochaix (1988), nor EST (2000) consider the interplay between
advertisement and noncompliance. In addition, these earlier models are purely theoretical
and, as we shall see below, EST’s model cannot be estimated with currently available data.
Finally, note that the agency approach to modeling drug selection, adopted in this paper,
ﬁnds additional support from the empirical analysis conducted by Hellerstein (1998) and Stern
and Trajtenberg (1998).
7For a general overview of this literature, see McGuire (2000). For an overview of agency problems related
speciﬁcally to drug selection, see Mott et al. (1998).
8In this paper, we shall refer to the doctor as “she” and to the patient as “he.”
52.2. Compliance Behavior
Although the precise measurement of noncompliance is a controversial topic, noncompliance is
widely recognized to be a serious public health problem. EST (2000) report an average rate of
noncompliance with drug prescription of 70% (20% purchase noncompliance and 50% use non
compliance). Dezii (2000) reports the rate of use noncompliance for the following classes of
medication: medications for diabetes (31%), tuberculosis medications (45%), antihypertensives
(47%), antipsychotics and schizophrenics (58%), and penicillin for rheumatic fever (67%).
As mentioned in the introduction, the annual cost of noncompliance is believed to reach up
to $170 billions in the U.S., which would exceed the expenses in prescription medications.
Noncompliance also have serious health implications: it has been estimated that up to 11.4%
of admissions to hospital resulted from failure to comply with drug regimen (Col, Fanale and
Kronholm 1990). A Study by Sullivan, Krelig and Hazlet (1990) also suggests that 125,000
cardiovascular deaths should be blamed annually in the U.S. on noncompliance. In fact, the
American Hearth Association has recently stated that “the cost of noncompliance in terms of
human life and money is shocking”, and has made prescription drug compliance one of the
association key issue.9
The problem of noncompliance has been primarily addressed in the medical literature.
The main questions of interest for the medical profession are: what are the determinants of
noncompliance? How is noncompliance inﬂuenced by the doctor-patient relationship? How can
compliance be improved?10 Note that in the medical literature, noncompliance was originally
seen as the result of the patient’s irrational behavior. This view has considerably evolved in
9American Heart Association statement, “American Hidden Health Threat ”, July 19 1999, available at
http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identiﬁer=9206.
10See for instance the extensive study of patient noncompliance conducted by Marinker et al. (1997) for the
Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain.
6recent years toward a more rational approach (Dezii 2000).
To the best of our knowledge, EST (2000) are the ﬁrst economists to explicitly analyze
noncompliance with drug prescriptions. Their model, however, ignores advertisement and it
could be estimated only with detailed data on noncompliance. As noted by the authors, these
data do not exist so far. In contrast, we develop a model that may be estimated with available
product level data, and without requiring the observation of noncompliance rates.
2.3. Prescription Drug Promotion
Prescription drug promotion by pharmaceutical ﬁrms takes two forms: the promotion aimed
at doctors, and advertisements directed to consumers. Advertisements toward doctors include
visits by pharmaceutical representatives, free samples, advertisements in medical journals, dis-
plays and presentations at professional meetings. Such promotions were the only form of
advertisement for prescription drugs until 1981, when drug companies expanded their mar-
keting strategies to include direct advertising to patients. Although the most familiar form
of promotion toward consumers is targeted to the general population via popular media, such
as television or magazines, DTCA is also commonly conveyed directly to patients through
web sites, help-lines, personalized mailings, targeted web-advertisement, and in-doctor-oﬃce
or in-pharmacy information pamphlets. After a brief moratorium in 1983, the FDA permitted
DTCA to resume in 1985 under stringent requirements on the informational content of ad-
vertisements. DTCA has grown signiﬁcantly, especially since 1997 when the FDA simpliﬁed
considerably the information requirements.11 The recent increase in advertisement spending,
11The information constraints related to drug advertising require the advertiser to provide a brief summary
relating to the side eﬀects, contraindications and eﬀectiveness of the advertised drug. In the late 1997, the FDA
issued a document, the Draft Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements ,w h i c h
makes it much easier for the drug advertisers to meet these requirements (Reeves 1998).
7combined with the relative shift in the structure of advertising (from promotion to doctors, to
DTCA) has intensiﬁed the controversy pertaining to the eﬀects of advertising on both doctors
and consumers.
Most of the controversy concerning promotion toward doctors is related to the informative
or the persuasive nature of advertising. A sampling of the arguments in this debate may be
found in Hurwitz and Caves (1988), and Berndt et al. (1997). Drug makers insist that promo-
tions are informative, but others (including some health practitioners and public health policy
makers) are concerned that advertising may inappropriately inﬂuence doctors’ prescription be-
havior. The ﬂavor of the debate may be appreciated in the contrast between a manufacturer’s
view (Holmer 1999), and views expressed by physicians (Rose 1997, Hollon 1999). Note that
in this debate, physicians also disagree among themselves (compare Backer et al. 2000 with
Westfall and Colorado 2000).
DTCA is currently by far the most controversial issue related to drug promotion. Reeves
(1998) provides a comprehensive review of the major steps in the evolution of DTCA regula-
tion. DTCA is still a relatively poorly understood phenomenon despite the prevalence of this
topic in the health care literature. This may be explained by the fact that detailed data on
DTCA are only starting to be available. The prescription drug advertising regulations in the
U.S. allow three types of DTCA: “health seeking advertisement,” “reminder advertisement,”
and “product-speciﬁc (or product claim) advertisement.” A health seeking advertisement in-
forms the consumers about the existence of a treatment for some particular condition, while
encouraging them to consult their doctors for more information. This type of advertisement
does not refer to a speciﬁc product to be used in the treatment of the condition. In contrast,
a reminder advertisement mentions the name of a drug and the drug company, but omits the
8drug indication. These were the two prevailing forms of DTCA prior to the 1997 FDA decision.
Product-speciﬁc advertisement reveals both the drug’s name and the indication. Since 1997,
it has become the fastest growing form of DTCA.
Opponents of DTCA argue that advertising intrudes upon the doctor-patient relationship.
For instance, patients may request from their doctor drugs that have been advertised, even
when these drugs are more expensive or not the most appropriate for their condition (see e.g.
Peters 2001). Supporters of DTCA, on the other hand, suggest that the information provided
through DTCA may educate the public to make more informed medical choices. For instance,
it has been recently shown that DTCA encourages untreated patients to consult their doctor
(see Wosinska 2002 and Izuka and Jin 2002).12 An additional potentially important social
beneﬁt, mentioned in Wosinska (2002) and explicitly studied here, is the inﬂuence of DTCA on
compliance. Responses to the FDA public inquiry mentioned in the introduction, indicate that
a wide majority of health professionals (including the National Health Council, the National
Institutes for Health Care Management, and representants of the FDA) believe that DTCA may
help curb down prescription noncompliance. The arguments most frequently advanced are that
DTCA acts as a reminder to take the drug, it comforts the patient, and makes him feel better
about the drug. These factors have been known for years to inﬂuence positively compliance
(Marinker 1997). Other respondents to the FDA inquiry, however, expressed skepticism, some
even suggesting that the long recitation of side eﬀe c t si m p o s e db yt h eF D Ao nD T C A ,m a yi n
fact reduce the likelihood that a patient complies to his doctor’s prescription. In other words,
although the eﬀect of DTCA on compliance is a important issue in the medical literature with
12Due to the lack of speciﬁc information on doctor’s visits, we cannot address this issue in the subsequent
application. However, as further explained below, DTCA for glaucoma drugs are essentially targeted toward
already diagnosed patients, rather than the general population. In other words, DTCA for glaucoma drugs does
not directly inﬂuence an individual’s decision to consult.
9serious health and policy implications, it still remains an open question, mostly ignored by
economists.
Moreover, promotion to doctors of expensive or poorly-performing drugs may also increase
the prescriptions of these drugs, and therefore, may have a negative impact on patients’ com-
pliance. Berger et al. (2001) and Wilkes et al. (2000) describe some empirical studies in
which the attitudes of diﬀerent groups of agents (patients, doctors, pharmacists) toward (in
particular) DTCA have been analyzed. These analyses, however, do not evaluate the impact
of DTCA on prescription and/or noncompliance behavior. More recently, an often-cited study
has been conducted by Scott-Levin, a market research company.13 The study shows a strong
positive relation between promotion eﬀorts toward patients, on one hand, and both prescrip-
tion and sales, on the other hand. However, the link between noncompliance, and both DTCA
and promotion to doctors is not addressed in this analysis.
3. A Model of Drug Product Selection
3.1. Preliminaries
It is assumed that an initial examination of the patient by the doctor has led to the diagnosis
of a disease, which is common knowledge. The disease may be treated either by one of J
alternative drugs in a given therapeutic class, or by an “outside” J+1-th method (e.g. surgery).
The patient, however, need not blindly follow the doctor’s choice regarding the treatment of
the disease. It is assumed that the doctor may not know precisely some of the patient’s
characteristics such as aspects of health history, anti-drug attitude, exposure to DTCA. In
addition, the doctor may not know how much the patient trusts her competence.
13“Direct-to-Consumer” Advertising Audit (August 2000), www.scottlevin.com.
10The doctor’s aim is to provide the best care to the patient by prescribing the drug that
best matches the patient’s observable characteristics (by the doctor). In doing so, the doctor
accounts for the expected compliance of the patient with the prescribed drug. An additional
factor that may inﬂuence the doctor’s preference for a speciﬁc drug is her exposure to adver-
tisement for that drug. Once the doctor has selected a given drug, the patient then chooses
to comply or not with the prescription. This choice is assumed to be a rational trade-oﬀ
between anticipated health beneﬁts, and both monetary and non-monetary costs associated
with compliance with the prescribed drug regimen. The non-monetary costs incurred during
the treatment may be more or less subjective, and include side eﬀects, dosage schedules, and
uneasiness stemming from anti-drug attitudes. In addition, the patient’s decision is assumed
to be inﬂuenced by DTCA.14
To summarize, the doctor-patient relationship is modeled as a sequential game in which the
doctor ﬁrst proposes, and the patient then disposes. The assumption that the doctor makes
the ﬁr s td e c i s i o ni sd i c t a t e db yt h er e a l - l i f ef a c tt hat the prescription decision power is vested in
the physician, even though the patient is free to comply with the prescribed medication. The
assumption does not rule out a possible bargaining process that may precede the prescription
decision, nor does it necessarily imply a conﬂict between the doctor and the patient about
w h i c hd r u gt oc h o o s e .
14Note that it is implicitly assumed that patients do not observe advertisement toward doctors.
113.2. The model
We consider a two-period game between the doctor and the patient.15 In period one, the doctor
chooses the drug to prescribe; in period 2, the patient reacts to this choice by complying or not
with the prescription.16 The doctor does not observe some characteristics p ∈ Rq of the patient.
The doctor knows, however, the probability distribution of this vector of characteristics.17
The patient’s preference is represented by a utility function which depends on the prescribed
alternative j (j =0 ,...,J), the patient’s privately known idiosyncratic characteristics p,a n d
the decision variable nc, which can take two possible values 1 (do not comply) and 0 (comply).
More precisely, when drug j is prescribed, patient p’s utility function over the alternatives (nc)





up + ω1 if nc =1(do not comply)
θjp − yjp + ω2 if nc =0(comply)
,
where up ≤ 0, θjp ≥ 0, yjp ≥ 0 and ωi (i =1 ,2) is a random shock satisfying E[ωi|p,j]=0 .
up and θjp represents the health outcome associated to noncompliance and compliance with
the prescription of drug j.T h e t e r m yjp may be interpreted as the inconvenience (or cost)
associated with compliance. As mentioned above, this cost may be due to the (high) price of
drug j and/or the side eﬀects associated with the consumption of this drug.
The patient’s decision will be based upon the expected utility Eω1,ω2[UP(nc;j,p)|p,j,nc],
15Any dynamic consideration, such as learning or reputation building, is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
16It is important to note that the game starts when a patient consults his doctor. As previously mentioned,
however, DTCA may aﬀect the patient decision to visit his doctor. This factor may be ignored for the purpose
of our study since i) DTCA for glaucoma drugs is not targeted toward the general population, and ii) the
motivations behind a consultation do not impact the compliance and prescription behaviors in our model.
17For the purposes of the paper, we do not need to specify the distributions of patients characteristics.
12where Eω1,ω2[. | .] is the conditional expectation operator taken with respect to ωi (i =1 ,2).





up if nc =1(do not comply)
θjp − yjp if nc =0(comply)
.
We shall assume that yjp can be written as yjp = yj + ηjp,w h e r eyj ≥ 0 may be interpreted
as the average costs (over the set of patients) associated with compliance. The average costs
yj is assumed to be common knowledge.18 The deviation from this average, ηjp, still accounts
for the interaction patient-drug.
Patient p’s optimal decision when prescribed drug j is the indicator function
nc∗(j,p)=1 {wjp≤yj}(p) ,
where wjp = θjp−up−ηjp. In other words, patient p chooses not to comply with the prescription
if the net expected costs incurred by complying is higher than the average costs associated
with noncompliance. The probability of noncompliance, Pr(nc∗(j,p)=1 )=Pr(wjp ≤ yj)=
Fj(yj), is the rate of noncompliance with the prescription of drug j, relatively to the probability
distribution of the vector p.
We now turn to the doctor’s decision. We assume, as it is done in the discrete-choice
literature, that drugs are ranked according to an indirect and random utility function
UD(j;nc,d,p)=X 
jβd − nc + ξj +  jd ,
18Doctors are assumed to know the average costs associated with compliance through the channel of scientiﬁc
meetings, publications, and various medical communications.
13where nc is the patient’s decision and ξj represents the characteristics of drug j that are
observed by the doctor, but unobservable to the econometrician. The components of the
vector Xj are the observable characteristics (known to the econometrician) of drug j,a n d jd
is a random shock. The negative sign in front of the patient’s decision (nc) indicates that the
doctor gets disutility from noncompliance.
The equilibrium for this game will be found by backward induction. Therefore, anticipating
the patient’s decision, the physician will substitute nc∗(j,p) for nc in her utility function.
However, since the doctor still has incomplete information about the patient’s characteristics,
she will average out her utility over the set of patients’ types (or characteristics), obtaining
U
D(j;d)=Ep[UD(j;nc∗(j,p),d,p)|j,d]=Xjβd − Fj(yj)+ξj +  jd ,
where, as explained earlier, Fj(.) represents the rate of patient noncompliance with the pre-
scription of drug j. The doctor then chooses the alternative j∗ that yields the highest expected
utility, given the anticipated choice of the patient and the doctor’s beliefs.
3.3. Theoretical Predictions
We now derive some theoretical predictions. As we shall see, however, to answer the questions
raised in the introduction, the model will need to be estimated. Let us start by making
a number of simplifying assumptions. Note that these assumptions are also introduced to
facilitate the estimation of the model with product-level data.
We assume that the coeﬃcient vector βd does not depend on the doctor’s characteristics,
and that the noncompliance rate function, Fj(.), is independent of j. In other words, the
noncompliance rate function is assumed to depend on the drug characteristics (j) only through
14its arguments (yj). The average costs yj associated with compliance is assumed to linearly
depend on a vector Zj of observable characteristics of product j (yj = Z 
jγ). These assumptions
rule out heterogeneity among doctors and among patients. Note that the most likely source of
heterogeneity among patients is related to drug coverage by third parties (e.g. HMO, private
insurance, Medicare, Medicaid). To account for this possible heterogeneity, one would need
individual-level data describing for every patient, and every drug the precise type of coverage.
Such detailed data were not available to us. However, available data on glaucoma patients
indicate that the vast majority of patients have some form of coverage.19 In addition, inspection
of several health plans indicates that drugs prescribed for glaucoma, which is a common but
potentially debilitating disease, are roughly equally covered by third party payers. Therefore,
the potential heterogeneity among glaucoma patients is likely to have a limited eﬀect on the
subsequent estimation.
Finally, to obtain closed form solutions, we assume that the random shocks  jd are i.i.d.
extreme value distributed, as it is usually done in the discrete choice literature. The probability
Pj that drug j is prescribed (the choice probability for drug j) is then of the logistic form,
where j =0refers to the outside alternative. When the outside alternative is assumed to yield
zero utility to the doctor (for the purpose of econometric identiﬁcation of the coeﬃcients, see











19Schappert (1995) reports that 61.9% of patients with glaucoma were covered by Medicare, while 36.6% had
a private or commercial insurance.
15From the above equality, we obtain the following relation:
ln(Pj) − ln(P0)=X 
jβ − F(Z 
jγ)+ξj , (3.1)
where P0 is the choice probability of the outside alternative.
One can immediately notice that if F(.), the noncompliance distribution, shifts down, then
the probability of prescription for any drug will increase relatively to the outside good. In
other words, a public policy that succeed in curbing noncompliance will aﬀect the structure of
the market by reducing the market share of the outside good.
Three variables will now be considered for the sensitivity analysis of the choice probabilities
and the rate of noncompliance. These are the drug price and the advertisement intensities
toward doctors and patients. We assume that the price and DTCA enter the utility of a
patient through the average cost of compliance, rather than the health outcomes associated to
compliance and noncompliance.20 These two variables are therefore component of the vector
Zj.L e tZj1 and Zj2 represent the price and the advertisement toward consumers (DTCA). It is
implicitly assumed that doctors care about drug prices only to the extent that they may aﬀect
their patients’ probability of compliance. Advertisement toward doctors inﬂuence the doctor’s
prescription but not the patient’s compliance, since we have assumed that advertisement toward
doctors are not observed by patients. Therefore, it will be a component of the vector Xj only
(say Xj1). A last assumption is that the cumulative distribution function F(.) (hereafter cdf)
is diﬀerentiable and its derivative is denoted by f(.).
Under these assumptions, the derivatives of the probability Pj with respect to the prices
20As noted earlier, most glaucoma patients have some form of (partial) coverage. It is widely recognized,
however, that the price is still one of the major factor of noncompliance with prescription of anti-glaucoma
drugs.
16of drug j and drug k  = j are:21
∂Pj
∂Zj1
= −f(Zjγ)γ1Pj(1 − Pj) and
∂Pj
∂Zk1
= f(Zkγ)γ1PjPk . (3.2)
The equalities in (3.2) show that prescription probabilities are suﬃcient statistics for their
own sensitivity to price. This property is often criticized because the implied elasticity of
demand exhibits unrealistic substitution patterns between products. Note, however, that this
criticism does not directly apply here since these substitution patterns concern prescription
and not purchase probabilities, which should not be considered equivalent due to the presence
of purchase noncompliance.
Prediction 1 :I fγ1 is positive, then an increase in the price of a drug will induce doctors
to prescribe that drug less often. A relative increase in the price of another drug k will induce
more frequent prescriptions for drug j.
Note that doctors may not necessarily take into account prices when prescribing a drug.
Indeed, the decision of the doctor is comparable to that of a university professor choosing a
book for her class. Her objective is to select the best book with the well-being of students in
mind.22 However, few faculty take into consideration prices when selecting a textbook.
We now analyze the eﬀects of DTCA on prescription. The derivatives of Pj with respect
to DTCA are as follows:
∂Pj
∂Zj2
= −f(Zjγ)γ2Pj(1 − Pj) and
∂Pj
∂Zk2
= f(Zkγ)γ2PjPk . (3.3)
21Unlike Rizzo (1999) we do not explicitly consider the interaction between price and advertisement.
22Note that the professor may be inﬂuenced by advertisement and free samples sent by editors, who often
(strategically?) “omit” to mention prices.
17Prediction 2:I fγ2 is negative, then an increase in DTCA intensity of a drug increases the
likelihood that the drug will be prescribed by doctors and decreases the chances that competing
drugs are prescribed.
This is a realistic feature of the model because advertisement of a drug toward patients is
likely to induce them to show interest for that drug when they meet their doctors. This in turn
may be perceived by doctors as a signal that the patients will be more likely to comply, should
that drug be prescribed. As a consequence, the doctors may be more inclined, caeteris paribus,
to prescribe the drug over a less advertised drug. However, γ2 may be statistically insigniﬁcant
in our sample if doctors perceive that DTCA does not aﬀect patients’ compliance behavior.
This hypothesis is reasonable, since it is typically recognized that doctors overwhelmingly
underestimate the prevalence of noncompliance (Marinker 1997).
Let us now analyze the inﬂuence of advertisement toward doctors on their prescription
behavior. This may be seen by computing the following derivatives:
∂Pj
∂Xj1
= β1Pj(1 − Pj) and
∂Pj
∂Xk1
= β1PjPk . (3.4)
Prediction 3:I fβ1 is positive, advertisement toward doctors for a drug has a positive (neg-
ative) eﬀect on the prescription probability for that (another) drug.
The determination of the statistical signiﬁcance of β1 will contribute to the debate pertain-
ing to whether or not doctors are actually inﬂuenced by promotional eﬀorts of drug companies.
The individual rates of noncompliance F(Z 
jγ)=Fj may be aggregated over the alternative
































jγ)γ2[1 − (Fj − F)] , (3.6)
where Xj1 and Zj2 stand respectively for the variables representing promotion toward doctors
and patients.
Prediction 4:I fγ2 is negative, then so is the right-hand side of the second equality in (3.6),
and an increase in DTCA for any drug will unambiguously lower the average noncompliance
rate.
Prediction 5:I fβ1 is positive and Fj > F (Fj < F) then an increase in the promotion
of drug j toward doctors will increase (reduce) the average noncompliance rate.
Predictions 4 and 5 suggest that, unlike DTCA, the eﬀect of promotion to doctors on the
average noncompliance rate is ambiguous. Indeed, advertising for drug j toward doctors will
reduce the average noncompliance rate only when drug j has an initially lower than average
noncompliance rate. In other words, if drugs with poor compliance rates are advertised to
doctors, then they may be induced to prescribe these drugs more often, thus contributing,
caeteris paribus, to an increase in the average noncompliance rate.
In summary, we have seen that to fully answer the questions raised in the introduction, we
need to estimate the model in order to determine the signs of the structural parameters.
194. Data and Estimation
4.1. Description of the Data
We use a data set, mainly provided by IMS America and CMR, on the U.S. market for anti-
glaucoma drugs. The remaining part of the sample was collected from diﬀerent sources to be
mentioned along with the description of the variables that enter in the structural econometric
model.
Glaucoma is an eye disease characterized by a high intra-ocular pressure (IOP). It is a
common disease aﬀecting some 2.25 million people in the United States. Health practitioners
are well aware of the signiﬁcant noncompliance problem with anti-glaucoma drugs. Indeed,
t h e s ed r u g sh a v es e v e r a ls i d ee ﬀects (e.g. decreased vision, eye discoloration, redness), their
usage is often inconvenient, and there is no immediate relationship between the use of the
drug, and the prevention of the most important consequence of the disease (blindness).
The data set has a panel structure, each 48 observed drugs deﬁning a time series for the
years 1995-1999. In other words, there is one observation for each drug and each year. Note
that the sample includes seven drugs that were introduced between 1995-1999. Although a drug
company may market several anti-glaucoma drugs, we assume that the set of characteristics
are independent across products. Every variable is listed below with the corresponding label in
parenthesis. To be consistent with the theoretical model, we diﬀerentiate three sets of variables
X, Z, and Y .
The components of the vector X are the variables inﬂuencing directly (i.e. not through the
rate of noncompliance) the doctor’s preference. These are
• Type of chemical structure (Class).
20Glaucoma drugs are usually classiﬁed according to their type of chemical structure. we
consider, the following seven classes.23
Class 0 : Beta-adrenergic blocking agents (or beta blockers).
Class 1 : Carbonic anhydrase inhibitors.
Class 2 : Parasympathomimetic agents (or miotics).
Class 3 : Sympathomimetic agents.
Class 4 : Alpha 2-adrenergic agonists.
Class 5 : Prostaglandins analogs.
Class 6 : Multiple ingredients drugs.
This classiﬁcation is motivated by the medical literature in which side eﬀects proﬁles and
t h er e l a t i v ee ﬀectiveness of glaucoma drugs are usually presented using a similar classi-
ﬁcation. Class is represented by six dummy variables, with “Class 0” as the reference
class.
• Mode of action (Action). Anti-glaucoma drugs fall in two broad categories: some lower
the intra-ocular pressure by increasing the outﬂow of the aqueous humor; others lower
the IOP by reducing the formation of the aqueous humor. These two categories of drugs
also diﬀer by their side eﬀects. Hence, action is a binary variable.
• Age (Drug_Age). This variable represents the number of months separating the current
date from the date the drug was launched on the market. Following Rizzo (1999), this
23The classiﬁcation is based on Munger (2001), World of Drug Information (2000), Lewis et al. (1999) and
CBS Health Watch (1999). In addition, we have separated single from multiple ingredients drugs. The latter
are put in a separated class (class 6).
21variable is assumed to capture life cycle patterns typically observed for pharmaceutical
products.
• Detailing costs (Dcosts). This variable represents the largest part (roughly 75%)o fa d v e r -
tising toward doctors. It includes the annual expenses for keeping representatives in the
ﬁeld. However, it does not contain the other expenses involved in support of the detailing
eﬀort, such as free samples. The variable is a deﬂated version of the corresponding IMS
variable. The deﬂator used is the producer price index for pharmaceutical preparations.
Advertising will be considered here as a ﬂow. This assumption ﬁnds support in Rizzo
(1999) who found that current detailing ﬂows have stronger eﬀects than detailing stocks
on the elasticity of demand.
The components of the vector Z are the variables that inﬂuence the patient’s total costs
(i.e. monetary and non-monetary) of compliance. These are
• Price (Dayprice) is the wholesale price deﬂated by the consumer price index for phar-
maceutical preparations.24 Each price is computed by dividing the wholesale price of a
drug by the number of days of treatment. The latter is estimated from the recommended
dosage found in the Physician’s Desk Reference.
• Direct-to-consumer advertising (Dtca). This variable represents the deﬂated annual
amount of DTCA spent by the pharmaceutical companies on each drug in our sample.
Although some drug companies advertise in popular media, most of the DTCA for glau-
coma drugs is targeted toward patients through (e.g.) specialized magazines, medical
websites, direct-mailing, or informative pamphlets.
24This price data are collected from the Red Book, Drug Topics, Montvale, NJ.
22• Dosage schedule (Howfreq). This variable shows the frequency of use of the drug as
recommended in the Physician’s Desk Reference. When the frequency is a range, we
choose the upper bound of the range.
• Form of presentation (Form). This is a dummy variable that indicates whether the drug
has other forms of presentation than drops.
Finally, the dependent variable Y is based on the annual market share for each drug. To
construct these shares, the quantities are computed as the ratio between sales and the price of a
day of treatment. The quantities are thus in days of treatment. Following the extensive analysis
by Hattenhauer et al. (1999), we set the annual share of the outside treatment (surgery) to
23%.
Table 1 summarizes the sales, prices, the spending on each type of advertisement, the total
advertisement (promotions to doctors and patients) to sales ratio, and the number of months
since the drug was launched over the entire period 1995-1999. Notice that drug promotion to
doctors is more than six time larger than DTCA. This ratio is slightly above the pharmaceutical
industry average, since glaucoma drugs do not belong to the small class of highly advertised
drugs. Note also that the standard deviations of the sales and advertisements variables are
large. This may be explained by the fact that the market for anti-glaucoma drugs is dominated
by few products, which account for most sales and advertisement (in 1999, 8 out of 46 products
accounted for roughly 83% of the sales). The high correlation between advertisement and sales
is illustrated in Graphs 1 and 2. Anti-glaucoma drugs may be broadly divided in two groups:
the ﬁrst includes highly advertised products with increasing sales (see Graph 1); the second
includes less advertised drugs with decreasing sales (see Graph 2). Note also that although
Xalatan and Alphagan are equally advertised, and their price ratio remains constant over
23time, the sales of Xalatan have increased considerably compared to Alphagan.A sw es h a l ls e e
later on, this empirical observation may be explained by the diﬀerence in noncompliance rate
between the two products. Finally, Graph 3 indicates a clear increase in price over time, but
the advertisement to sales ratio does not exhibit any obvious trend.
4.2. Estimation Strategy
E q u a t i o n( 3 . 1 )i st h eb a s i ce q u a t i o nt ob ee s t i m a t e d . M o r ep r e c i s e l y ,w ew i s ht oe s t i m a t e
the parameters vectors β,γ, and the unknown cdf F(.).S i n c e F(.) does not have a known
analytical form, and that we want to impose the least structure possible, we are led to perform
a semiparametric estimation of the unknowns in our model. To do this, however, we ﬁrst need
to address the following two problems.
4.2.1. Sample Selection
The prescription probabilities, in the left-hand-side of equation (3.1) are not observed in our
sample. The only information available to us is the sales in dollars for each drug. The sales and
prescriptions, however, are not equivalent since many prescriptions are not turned into sales due
to purchase noncompliance, which is believed to aﬀect around 20% of all prescriptions. Failure
to distinguish between prescriptions and sales (as in Wosinska 2002), would lead to severely
biased estimates in the present study. Indeed, the unobserved purchase noncompliance is
generally believed to be inﬂuenced by variables entering the right-hand-side of equation (3.1),
such as the price, or the drug reputation generated in part by DTCA.
The drug sales, however, are suﬃcient to estimate the model. Indeed, from such data we
can compute P(j|B) the share (in quantity) of drug j in the population of ﬁlled prescriptions,
24where B stands for “A Prescribed Drug is Bought.” So, P(j|B) is the probability that drug j is
prescribed, conditional on a drug being bought. Recall that we denoted by Pj the corresponding





where P(B|j) is the probability of purchase if drug j is prescribed and P(B) is the unconditional
probability of purchase (the proportion of purchased drugs among prescribed drugs). Dividing
both sides of the preceding equality by the analogous expressions for the outside alternative
















where the last equation is obtained from (3.1).
As noted above, we observe only the probability P(j|B).T h e r e f o r e , i f w e d e ﬁne a new
unobservable variable ˜ ξj as









jβ − F(Z 
jγ)+˜ ξj. (4.1)
Equation (4.1) may then be estimated from the available data, provided that the purchase
25probability of a drug is driven by its price and the reputation generated by its level of DTCA.25
It has to be noted that this approach will not allow us to estimate the magnitude of the
parameters, but only their signs. This, however, is suﬃcient to determine the signs of the
derivatives (3.2) to (3.6), and, therefore, we will be able to answer the questions raised in the
introduction.
4.2.2. Endogeneity
As it is traditionally the case with discrete choice models, the unobserved characteristics (to
the econometrician) are likely to be correlated with the prices and advertisement variables.
Therefore, the estimation method must account for this endogeneity problem. We handle this
problem by applying the “control function method” (see e.g., Newey, Powell and Vella 1999,
or Blundell and Powell 2000).
The method consists of including as additional regressors to equation (4.1) the residuals of
the nonparametric regressions of the endogenous variables on the instruments. Endogeneity is
therefore treated in that approach as an omitted variable problem. In the present context, the
endogenous variables are the detailing costs (Dcosts), the prices (Dayprice)a n dD T C A( Dtca).
Let us denote the vector of endogenous variables by N and the remaining exogenous variables as
e. Equation (4.1) may then be written as Yj = φ(Nj,e j)+˜ ξj,i nw h i c hE(Y |Nj,e j)  = φ(Nj,e j)
because of the endogeneity problem.
Consider now the nonparametric regression equations Ni,j = mi(ej)+ui,j (i =1 ,2,3),
where ui,j are uncorrelated error terms and mi(.) are unknown functions. Our application of
the method relies on the assumption that in the presence of both u and e,t h ev a r i a b l eξ is
25This assumption appears reasonable since prices and reputation are the principal information available to
patients at the time of purchase.
26correlated only with u =( u1,u 2,u 3) :
E(ξ|u,e)=E(ξ|u), and E(u|e)=0 . (4.2)
These assumptions imply
E(Y |N,e)=φ(N,e)+E(ξ|N,e)=φ(N,e)+E(ξ|u)=φ(N,e)+ϕ(u) ,
where ϕ(u)=E(ξ|u). The method therefore consists in two steps: in step 1, we perform
a nonparametric regression of each of the endogenous on the exogenous variables. In other
words, we sequentially estimate the equations
Ni,j = mi(ej)+ui,j (i =1 ,...,3). (4.3)
we obtain the residuals ˆ ui from these regressions. In step 2, we estimate a modiﬁed version of
equation (4.1):
Yj =l nP(j|B) − lnP(0|B)=E[lnP(j|B) − lnP(0|B)|X,Z, ˆ u]
= X 
jβ − F(Z 
jγ)+ϕ(ˆ uj
 δ)+ξj , (4.4)
where ˆ u =(ˆ u1, ˆ u2, ˆ u3)  is the vector of residuals obtained in step 1.
To verify whether our model’s hypotheses, and in particular the hypothesis in equation
(4.2), may be considered reasonable, we also estimate nonparametrically the more general
27model
Yj = Φ(Nj,e j)+vj , (4.5)
in which E(Y |Nj,e j)=Φ(Nj,e j). If our model is correctly speciﬁed, then Φ(Nj,e j)=
φ(Nj,e j)+ϕ(uj), or equivalently ξj = vj. The informal veriﬁcation technique, will there-
fore consist in comparing the estimated residuals of the two econometric models in equations
(4.4) and (4.5).26
4.2.3. Practical Considerations
To avoid the curse of dimensionality, we have assumed that the nonparametric multiple regres-
sions in steps 1 and 2 are index models (Ichimura and Lee 1991, Ichimura 1993). To ensure
the identiﬁcation of the parameter γ, we further assume that  γ  =1 . Although, the nuisance
parameters (δ, λ)a r ei d e n t i ﬁed only up to a multiplicative factor, the expressions ϕ(u δ) and
m(e λ), if regarded as parameters, are identiﬁed. This identiﬁcation issue is not a serious
problem here, since δ and λ are nuisance parameters, and we are only interested in the signs













where n is the sample size, γ is a vector of parameters to be estimated, K(x) is a cdf associated
with a kernel derivative k(.),a n dhK is a bandwidth controlling the smoothness of the kernel
estimates. In practice, we select K(x)=( 1+e−x)−1,t h ec d fo fal o g i s t i cd i s t r i b u t i o n .
26More traditional tests, such as the Hausman test, cannot be applied in the present context due to the
semiparametric structure of the model.
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where g(.) is a gaussian kernel, hmi and hϕ are bandwidths, and β,γ,λ,δ are parameter
vectors to be estimated. Following Pagan and Ullah (1999), the optimal bandwidths in all
nonparametric estimations are approximated by least squares cross-validation.








W(ek)[Nk − ˆ mi(e 
kˆ λ)]2 i =1 ,...,3 , (4.7)
where W(.) is a standard weighting function that may be chosen optimally in order to minimize
t h ev a r i a n c eo ft h ee s t i m a t o r .
In step 2, the parameters (β,γ,δ) are estimated by solving
min
ˆ β,ˆ γ,ˆ δ





W(Xi,Z i)[Yi − X 
iˆ β + ˆ F(Z 
iˆ γ) −   ϕ(ˆ u ˆ δ)]2 . (4.8)
The optimal weight functions W(.) are approximated sequentially by estimating the covariance
matrix of the estimates in equations (4.7) and (4.8). Under standard regularity conditions
on the kernel functions and the bandwidths, Ichimura (1993) shows that the parameters are
consistent and asymptotically gaussian.
294.3. Results
We report in Table 2 the results of the estimations conducted in step 2.27 Recall that the
magnitude of the eﬀects of the explanatory variables on the prescription probabilities and the
average noncompliance rate cannot be evaluated from the values of the estimated parameters.28
Therefore, we will only discuss here the economic interpretation that may be given to the signs
of the parameters. Before describing the estimation results, let us point out that Graph 4
indicates that the residual estimated with our model (i.e. equation 4.4), and the residuals
estimated with the general model (i.e. equation 4.5), are very similar.29 This result there-
fore suggests that the hypotheses imposed to derive our structural model may be considered
reasonable.
All the components of the vectors β and γ but two (the parameters associated with the
variables Class 1 and Form)a r es i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Note also that all the statis-
tically signiﬁcant parameters have the expected signs. In particular, β3 to β7 are all negative,
which indicates that the drugs in class 1 (the beta blockers) are prescribed more often. This
was expected, since beta blockers have remained over time the mainstay therapy for glaucoma.
β9 is positive, which suggests that there is a ﬁrst mover advantage, in the sense that a drug
introduced earlier is more prescribed than a newer drug with similar characteristics. In other
words, the sample tends to indicate the presence of learning and/or habit formation on the
part of doctors. Finally, γ1 is signiﬁcant and positive, which indicates that doctors are sen-
27The estimates of the nuisance parameters, δ and λ,a r en o tr e p o r t e dh e r ef o rt h es a k eo fb r e v i t y ,s i n c et h e y
have no economic interpretation.
28This also implies that we will not be able to conduct some ex-post simulations to predict how a change in
variables may aﬀect doctors and/or patients behavior.
29More speciﬁcally, the null hypothesis that   ξ and   v have the same distribution cannot be rejected by a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (P-value=0.127). In addition, the null hypothesis that the slope parameter is equal
to 1 in the regression of   v on   ξ cannot be rejected (P-value=0.153).
30sitive to price changes. This result conﬁrms several empirical studies that demonstrate that
when patients pay less for a drug, doctors write more prescriptions for that drug, as a response
to increased requests by patients (see Lavizzo-Mourrey and Eisenberg 1990). In our model,
these requests inﬂuence doctors decisions only through the anticipated reduction in patient
noncompliance.
As expected, β1 and γ1 are both positive, while γ2 is negative. Therefore, we are now in
position to answer the two questions raised in the introduction. Advertisement for a given
anti-glaucoma drug toward doctors and/or patients increases the number of prescriptions for
that drug. In other words, contrary to the opinion expressed by many doctors, advertisements
toward doctors aﬀect their prescription behavior, independently of the characteristics of the
advertised drug. In addition, although not directly exposed to DTCA, doctors are indirectly
inﬂuenced by DTCA through their patients’ expected noncompliance.
DTCA unambiguously lowers the average rate of noncompliance with anti-glaucoma drugs.
This result tends to support the opinions of proponents of DTCA recently expressed in front of
the FDA. However, we cannot assess from our analysis, whether the reduction in noncompliance
is due to the information content of DTCA, or to the fact that doctors tend to prescribe drugs
with a high DTCA intensity, which are likely to be preferred by patients. In contrast, promotion
to doctors has an ambiguous inﬂuence on the average noncompliance rate. Indeed, the average
noncompliance rate increases when the advertised drug has initially a higher than average rate
of noncompliance. In other words, if the average compliance rate is taken as a component
of health care quality, then advertisement toward doctors have a negative impact on patients
when the drugs advertised to doctors have a high noncompliance rate. To determine whether
this was the case on the market for anti-glaucoma drugs, we now turn to the estimation of the
31noncompliance rates.
We report in Table 3 the estimated probability of noncompliance for each product and
each year. In addition the annual average noncompliance rates are shown in Table 4. First
note that the overall, as well as the individual rates of noncompliance are consistent with
the corresponding rates found in the literature for anti-glaucoma drugs (Wick and Zani 2000)
and for other therapeutic classes (Dezii 2000). More speciﬁcally, Rotchford and Murphy (1998)
evaluate the noncompliance rate of the Drug Timolol in 1998 at around 51%, while we estimate
the corresponding rate at 55%. Simon (1999) also reports an approximate noncompliance rate
of 62% for the drug Diamox,w h i l eo u rﬁgures range between 66.1% in 1995 to 59.6% in 1999.30
These results suggest that the model and the estimates are sensible.
Graph 5 indicates that the annual distributions of noncompliance rates across products are
rather concentrated around their modes and slightly asymmetric with a predominance of rates
above the mean. Table 4 and Graph 5, also clearly show a decline in noncompliance (both
at the average and individual level) between 1995 and 1999. In particular, the noncompliance
mode in 1995 (slightly above 0.7) has become highly improbable in 1999. Note also that the
average noncompliance rate decreases sharply after the 1997 FDA decision on DTCA (see Table
4). This result may be explained by the fact that, as previously noted, DTCA unambiguously
reduces the average rate of noncompliance. We should not exclude, however, that the growing
concerns among doctors also played a role in the reduction of average noncompliance. However,
recall that advertisement toward doctors has an ambiguous eﬀect on the average noncompliance
rate. Graph 6, actually shows that the most highly advertised drugs toward doctors have
30See the document on compliance by the Glaucoma Associates of New York at
www.glaucma.net/gany/patser/compliance.html. These are the only two individual noncompliance rates
for anti-glaucoma drugs we were able to ﬁnd in the literature.
32a noncompliance rate above average. In other words, advertisement toward doctors had a
negative impact on the average noncompliance rate with anti-glaucoma drugs between 1995
and 1999.
Let us now concentrate on two of the most popular products (Xalatan and Alphagan).
First, note that every year between 1996 and 1999, Xalatan has the smallest noncompliance
rate among all products in our sample. This is a remarkable result for our structural model,
since Xalatan is known among doctors to be the most convenient drug to use. Indeed, Xalatan
is a once a day eye drop, while its competitors (except Cosopt, a recently introduced multiple-
ingredient drugs) require at least 2 applications per day. This result may also partially explain
why, although Alphagan and Xalatan are equally advertised, and their price ratio remained
constant over time, the markets share for Xalatan grew at a faster rate than that of Alphagan.
Indeed, we have seen that, caeteris paribus, doctors prefer to prescribe a drug with a higher
compliance rate.
5. Conclusion
This paper is the ﬁrst integrated study of patient noncompliance and drug advertising toward
doctors and/or patients in a physician agency model. The object was to determine the in-
ﬂuence of noncompliance and advertising on doctors’ prescription behavior, and the eﬀect of
advertising on patients’ noncompliance. To address these questions, we opted, due to data
limitations, for a parsimonious discrete choice model with no more structure than was neces-
sary to estimate the parameters with the data currently available. The model describes the
prescription behavior of a doctor facing a patient who may fail to comply with the prescription.
We apply semiparametric techniques to estimate the structural model using U.S. product level
33data on anti-glaucoma drugs. In particular, these econometric techniques allow us to estimate
the individual, as well as the aggregated noncompliance rates. The estimation results suggest
that (i) doctors are sensitive to drug prices and noncompliance, and their prescription behav-
ior is inﬂuenced by both types of advertisement; (ii) the overall noncompliance rate on the
market for anti-glaucoma drugs is estimated at around 58%, and it is shown to decrease signif-
icantly between 1995 and 1999; (iii) DTCA (respectively, promotion to doctors) contributed
to (respectively, slowed down) the reduction of the overall noncompliance rate observed in our
sample.
Note, however, that the estimation results generated by structural models may be inﬂuenced
by the restrictions, and the functional forms imposed. In the present paper, we strived to set
the most neutral restrictions possible, and not to impose any functional forms when possible.
As an illustration, the probability of noncompliance was estimated semiparametrically. The
estimation results, however, appear sensible, and the estimated noncompliance rates are in
accordance with the few ﬁgures available in the medical literature.
Note also that some aspects of the glaucoma market and the doctor-patient relationship
have not been fully taken into consideration in the paper. These include, on the theoretical
side, long term care which allow the patient and the doctor to learn about each other as times
goes by. On the empirical side, we did not consider heterogeneity among doctors and among
patients. Finally, we did not account for other parties entering the agency problem such as,
for instance, HMOs or insurance companies. We are currently looking for data to investigate
these extensions.
To conclude, it is important to note that the modeling of the interplay between noncom-
pliance and advertising allows us to capture realistically the behaviors of both doctors and
34patients and their consequences on the glaucoma market. For instance, the relative perfor-
mance of Xalatan compared to, for instance, Alphagan may be partially explained by the
signiﬁcantly lower estimated noncompliance rate of Xalatan. Finally, the empirical relevance
of the interplay between noncompliance and advertising is demonstrated by the introduction
of the two newest drugs since 1999 (Lumigan and Travatan have been approved by the FDA
in 2001). The launch of these two drugs is accompanied by an important advertising campaign
(both to doctors and patients) and their ease of use is comparable to Xalatan. In particular,
just like Xalatan, Lumigan and Travatan are both once-a-day eye drops.31
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Table 1 : Descriptive Statistics For Glaucoma Drugs Market (1995-1999) 
 
Sales 
(in $ thousand) 
 
DTCA 




(in $ thousand) 
Number on 
Months since Drug 
Launch 
Advertisement 
to Sales Ratio 
Mean 15,961.552  36.481  226.914  154.76  0.0184 
Standard Deviation  35,280.041  88.567  521.719  112.23  0.071 
Max 30,3036.00  704.263  2,803.976  405.00  0.733 





TABLE 2 : Estimation Results 

























































                                      52737 . 0 1 = m H  
Bandwiths step 1 :          78003 . 0 2 = m H  
                                      40327 . 0 3 = m H  
                                         41499 . 0 = K H  
Bandwiths step 2 :          45885 . 0 = k H  
                                        60423 . 0 = φ H  
Objective Function in step 2  :   1.73622E-6 
Numbers in parenthesis refer to standard deviations. Standard deviations have been estimated by a standard Bootstrap technique. 
** (*) indicates parameters significantly different from 0 at a 5% (10%) level. 
Optimal Windows have been approximated by Least Squares Cross Validations. 
 
 





Rate ( j F ) 






Rate ( j F ) 
t j F F −  
 
Year 1995 
ACETAZOLAMIDE 0000 USA  0.57257 -0.06202  MIOCHOL 1187 NSV  0.54515 -0.10632 
ADSORBOCARPINE 1187 ALC  0.69796 0.10112  MIOCHOL SY/PK PLUS 1288 NSV  0.49770 -0.02099 
AKARPINE 0576 AKO  0.65864 -0.01330 MIOCHOL SYSTEM PAK 1188 NSV  0.46299 -0.08850 
AKBETA 0894 AKO  0.59697 -0.01074  MIOCHOL-E 0894 NSV  0.58722 -0.06752 
BETAGAN 0386 ALL  0.58850 0.03267  MZM 1293 NSV  0.72726 0.08338 
BETIMOL 0695 NSV  0.60145 0.00783  NEPTAZANE 1187 SZO  0.56804 0.06319 
BETOPTIC 0985 ALC  0.68713 0.01039  OCUPRESS 0492 NSV  0.69925 0.00333 
BETOPTIC S 0290 ALC  0.61889 0.01456  OCUSERT PILO-20 1187 ALZ  0.67718 0.08116 
DARANIDE 0875 MSD  0.79058 0.04668  OCUSERT PILO-40 1187 ALZ  0.69596 0.08095 
DIAMOX 0362 SZO  0.66137 0.03280  OPTIPRANOLOL 0790 BSP  0.58581 -0.02473 
EPIFRIN 1269 ALL  0.52246 -0.02474  P1 E1 0466 ALC  0.50131 -0.09639 
E-PILO 0566 NSV  0.53396 -0.10650  P2 E1 0466 ALC  0.47645 -0.13007 
EPINAL 1187 ALC  0.65713 -0.02939  P4 E1 0466 ALC  0.53782 -0.09785 
EPPY/N 1275 B.H  0.51950 -0.05560  P6 E1 1187 ALC  0.56338 -0.07037 
GLAUCON 1187 ALC  0.55094 -0.08184 PHOSPHOLINE IODIDE 1187 WYE  0.56342 0.02470 
GLAUCTABS 0894 AKO  0.73754 0.11881  PILAGAN 0688 ALL  0.59111 0.01474 
HUMORSOL 1187 MSD  0.72026 0.03071  PILOCAR OPHTH 0466 NSV  0.55792 0.00390 
IOPIDINE 0588 ALC  0.77915 0.05917  PILOPTIC 1084 OTP  0.56463 -0.01840 
ISOPTO CARBACHOL 1187 ALC  0.52889 0.00911  PROPINE 0680 ALL  0.68684 0.08343 
ISOPTO CARPINE 0566 ALC  0.65635 0.00491  TIMOPTIC 0978 MSD  0.51767 -0.02273 
LEVOBUNOLOL HCL 0000 USA  0.75541 0.02333  TIMOPTIC-XE 0194 MSD  0.70295 0.09072 
METHAZOLAMIDE 0000 USA  0.85122 0.12392  TRUSOPT 0595 MSD  0.61150 0.02728 
Year 1996 
ACETAZOLAMIDE 0000 USA  0.61712 -0.03943  MIOCHOL SY/PK PLUS 1288 NSV  0.50286 -0.01384 
ADSORBOCARPINE 1187 ALC  0.61460 0.01720 MIOCHOL SYSTEM PAK 1188 NSV  0.51694 -0.06658 
AKARPINE 0576 AKO  0.54567 -0.00127  MIOCHOL-E 0894 NSV  0.50811 -0.06896 
AKBETA 0894 AKO  0.58061 0.01681  MZM 1293 NSV  0.76332 0.08338 
AKPRO 0296 AKO  0.70242 0.07226  NEPTAZANE 1187 SZO  0.66214 0.08851 
ALPHAGAN 1096 ALL  0.63938 0.03038  OCUPRESS 0492 NSV  0.64231 0.01611 
BETAGAN 0386 ALL  0.52078 0.03728  OCUSERT PILO-20 1187 ALZ  0.64167 0.06883 
BETIMOL 0695 NSV  0.62154 -0.02296  OCUSERT PILO-40 1187 ALZ  0.78075 0.08362 
BETOPTIC 0985 ALC  0.59037 0.04292  OPTIPRANOLOL 0790 BSP  0.60477 -0.03464 
BETOPTIC S 0290 ALC  0.66361 0.04265  P1 E1 0466 ALC  0.47888 -0.12868 
DARANIDE 0875 MSD  0.67762 0.07241  P2 E1 0466 ALC  0.47836 -0.14431 
DIAMOX 0362 SZO  0.63495 0.04263  P4 E1 0466 ALC  0.44124 -0.09275 
EPIFRIN 1269 ALL  0.68805 0.00682  P6 E1 1187 ALC  0.53918 -0.09269 
E-PILO 0566 NSV  0.43656 -0.15781 PHOSPHOLINE IODIDE 1187 WYE  0.63526 0.04512 
EPINAL 1187 ALC  0.57977 -0.05725  PILAGAN 0688 ALL  0.53100 0.02557 
GLAUCON 1187 ALC  0.46122 -0.11708  PILOCAR OPHTH 0466 NSV  0.60870 0.02287 
GLAUCTABS 0894 AKO  0.69487 0.07429  PILOPTIC 1084 OTP  0.59196 -0.02097 
HUMORSOL 1187 MSD  0.71503 0.03577  PROPINE 0680 ALL  0.59134 0.02805 
IOPIDINE 0588 ALC  0.59024 0.08977  TIMOLOL MALEATE 0000 USA  0.64645 0.03531 




Rate ( j F ) 






Rate ( j F ) 
t j F F −  
 
Year 1996 
ISOPTO CARPINE 0566 ALC  0.58414 -0.02033  TIMOPTIC-XE 0194 MSD  0.60870 0.59622 
LEVOBUNOLOL HCL 0000 USA  0.63021 0.02483  TRUSOPT 0595 MSD  0.68490 0.66044 
METHAZOLAMIDE 0000 USA  0.74696 0.05760  XALATAN 0896 PHU  0.37780 0.38212 
MIOCHOL 1187 NSV  0.54051 -0.08260      
Year 1997 
ACETAZOLAMIDE 0000 USA  0.41103 -0.07556  MIOCHOL 1187 NSV  0.49581 -0.07812 
ADSORBOCARPINE 1187 ALC  0.66797 0.02811  MIOCHOL SY/PK PLUS 1288 NSV  0.54438 -0.02315 
AKARPINE 0576 AKO  0.65607 0.00451  MIOCHOL-E 0894 NSV  0.50128 -0.03073 
AKBETA 0894 AKO  0.56994 0.01209  MZM 1293 NSV  0.73088 0.06862 
AKPRO 0296 AKO  0.63469 0.03335  NEPTAZANE 1187 SZO  0.71980 0.07033 
ALPHAGAN 1096 ALL  0.67364 0.03716  OCUPRESS 0492 NSV  0.56008 0.03130 
BETAGAN 0386 ALL  0.60232 0.05001  OCUSERT PILO-20 1187 ALZ  0.70222 0.08709 
BETIMOL 0695 NSV  0.58175 -0.00303  OCUSERT PILO-40 1187 ALZ  0.70273 0.06365 
BETOPTIC 0985 ALC  0.70155 0.05789  OPTIPRANOLOL 0790 BSP  0.54969 0.00873 
BETOPTIC S 0290 ALC  0.65464 0.04328  P1 E1 0466 ALC  0.39883 -0.10647 
CARBACHOL 0000 USA  0.36974 -0.17917  P2 E1 0466 ALC  0.44332 -0.10420 
DARANIDE 0875 MSD  0.73049 0.04425  P4 E1 0466 ALC  0.43510 -0.09946 
DIAMOX 0362 SZO  0.62206 0.05168  P6 E1 1187 ALC  0.50264 -0.08719 
EPIFRIN 1269 ALL  0.53493 -0.00354  PHOSPHOLINE IODIDE 1187  0.60018 0.03452 
E-PILO 0566 NSV  0.47857 -0.09341  PILAGAN 0688 ALL  0.62906 0.02567 
EPINAL 1187 ALC  0.52033 -0.01966  PILOCAR OPHTH 0466 NSV  0.55703 -0.00276 
GLAUCON 1187 ALC  0.51314 -0.08121  PILOPTIC 1084 OTP  0.49130 -0.02144 
GLAUCTABS 0894 AKO  0.61961 0.06109  PROPINE 0680 ALL  0.64189 0.08332 
HUMORSOL 1187 MSD  0.65424 0.04004  TIMOLOL MALEATE 0000 USA  0.59393 0.01073 
IOPIDINE 0588 ALC  0.68971 0.09915  TIMOPTIC 0978 MSD  0.57622 0.04607 
ISOPTO CARBACHOL 1187 ALC  0.57482 -0.02103  TIMOPTIC-XE 0194 MSD  0.67590 0.05489 
ISOPTO CARPINE 0566 ALC  0.47457 -0.00910  TRUSOPT 0595 MSD  0.65691 0.05582 
LEVOBUNOLOL HCL 0000 USA  0.59580 0.00981  XALATAN 0896 PHU  0.38181 -0.21106 
METHAZOLAMIDE 0000 USA  0.78250 0.07057      
Year 1998 
ACETAZOLAMIDE 0000 USA  0.45277 -0.05127  METHAZOLAMIDE 0000 USA  0.59508 0.08474 
ADSORBOCARPINE 1187 ALC  0.47347 0.01222  MIOCHOL 1187 NSV  0.47584 -0.08364 
AKARPINE 0576 AKO  0.51200 0.01975  MIOCHOL SY/PK PLUS 1288 NSV  0.42657 -0.04850 
AKBETA 0894 AKO  0.57913 0.03222  MIOCHOL-E 0894 NSV  0.47415 -0.04963 
ALPHAGAN 1096 ALL  0.62633 0.05320  MZM 1293 NSV  0.57854 0.10222 
AZOPT 0498 ALC  0.65823 0.05864  NEPTAZANE 1187 SZO  0.75373 0.12115 
BETAGAN 0386 ALL  0.51768 0.05111  OCUPRESS 0492 NSV  0.56400 0.05602 
BETIMOL 0695 NSV  0.48200 -0.00080  OCUSERT PILO-20 1187 ALZ  0.66754 0.04991 
BETOPTIC 0985 ALC  0.60478 0.00601  OCUSERT PILO-40 1187 ALZ  0.49532 0.05800 
BETOPTIC S 0290 ALC  0.64996 0.04107  OPTIPRANOLOL 0790 BSP  0.45552 0.00798 
CARBACHOL 0000 USA  0.32013 -0.16915  P1 E1 0466 ALC  0.48481 -0.08170 
COSOPT 0498 MSD  0.37045 -0.09427  P2 E1 0466 ALC  0.43155 -0.09818 
DARANIDE 0875 MSD  0.57495 0.04116  P4 E1 0466 ALC  0.42893 -0.07330 
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Rate ( j F ) 
t j F F −  
 
Year 1998 
EPIFRIN 1269 ALL  0.54357 -0.00690 PHOSPHOLINE IODIDE 1187 WYE  0.54975 0.02121 
E-PILO 0566 NSV  0.44775 -0.05447  PILAGAN 0688 ALL  0.58706 0.03901 
EPINAL 1187 ALC  0.46141 -0.01678  PILOCAR OPHTH 0466 NSV  0.59780 -0.00282 
GLAUCON 1187 ALC  0.36642 -0.11026  PILOPTIC 1084 OTP  0.53848 0.03188 
GLAUCTABS 0894 AKO  0.49378 0.08103  PROPINE 0680 ALL  0.58245 0.03418 
HUMORSOL 1187 MSD  0.43393 -0.00712  TIMOLOL MALEATE 0000 USA  0.55276 0.02686 
IOPIDINE 0588 ALC  0.54189 0.08727  TIMOPTIC 0978 MSD  0.61469 0.01322 
ISOPTO CARBACHOL 1187 ALC  0.57857 -0.02221  TIMOPTIC-XE 0194 MSD  0.60681 0.06442 
ISOPTO CARPINE 0566 ALC  0.46991 -0.00010  TRUSOPT 0595 MSD  0.57521 0.03905 
LEVOBUNOLOL HCL 0000 USA  0.53654 -0.00893  XALATAN 0896 PHU  0.30934 -0.18357 
Year 1999 
ACETAZOLAMIDE 0000 USA  0.48968 -0.07308  METHAZOLAMIDE 0000 USA  0.54706 0.05197 
ADSORBOCARPINE 1187 ALC  0.52214 0.01095  MIOCHOL 1187 NSV  0.41087 -0.10192 
AKARPINE 0576 AKO  0.52735 0.03327  MIOCHOL SY/PK PLUS 1288 NSV  0.41705 -0.02320 
AKBETA 0894 AKO  0.51062 0.01998  MIOCHOL-E 0894 NSV  0.43054 -0.03195 
ALPHAGAN 1096 ALL  0.60492 0.04055  MZM 1293 NSV  0.57306 0.05814 
AZOPT 0498 ALC  0.60332 0.07485  NEPTAZANE 1187 SZO  0.55054 0.07674 
BETAGAN 0386 ALL  0.53304 0.00998  OCUPRESS 0492 NSV  0.63062 0.05835 
BETIMOL 0695 NSV  0.51323 -0.02500  OCUSERT PILO-20 1187 ALZ  0.57981 0.08149 
BETOPTIC 0985 ALC  0.52846 0.02611  OCUSERT PILO-40 1187 ALZ  0.48887 0.09507 
BETOPTIC S 0290 ALC  0.54402 0.02885  OPTIPRANOLOL 0790 BSP  0.46262 -0.00729 
CARBACHOL 0000 USA  0.37303 -0.15294  P1 E1 0466 ALC  0.40836 -0.10381 
COSOPT 0498 MSD  0.38690 -0.09909  P2 E1 0466 ALC  0.42706 -0.06775 
DARANIDE 0875 MSD  0.61626 0.05175  P4 E1 0466 ALC  0.51588 -0.05754 
DIAMOX 0362 SZO  0.59579 0.06588  P6 E1 1187 ALC  0.45817 -0.05949 
EPIFRIN 1269 ALL  0.51246 -0.01465 PHOSPHOLINE IODIDE 1187 WYE  0.50265 0.04703 
E-PILO 0566 NSV  0.43288 -0.07882  PILOCAR OPHTH 0466 NSV  0.43719 -0.04466 
GLAUCON 1187 ALC  0.42522 -0.07068  PILOPTIC 1084 OTP  0.50884 -0.00557 
GLAUCTABS 0894 AKO  0.54631 0.07988  PROPINE 0680 ALL  0.50620 0.08396 
HUMORSOL 1187 MSD  0.49728 0.03302  TIMOLOL MALEATE 0000 USA  0.35565 -0.09735 
IOPIDINE 0588 ALC  0.57951 0.07887  TIMOPTIC 0978 MSD  0.58149 0.04210 
ISOPTO CARBACHOL 1187 ALC  0.49711 -0.01527  TIMOPTIC-XE 0194 MSD  0.51521 0.04347 
ISOPTO CARPINE 0566 ALC  0.52460 0.04838  TRUSOPT 0595 MSD  0.63449 0.09324 




Table 4 : Overall Noncompliance Rate  with Glaucoma Prescription per Year 
Year 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 










Numbers in parenthesis refer to standard deviations. Standard deviations have been estimated by a standard Bootstrap technique. 
 Graph 2 : Evolution of Sales and Advertisement
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Graph 1 : Evolution of Sales and Advertisement













































































































































Ads to Sales Ratio Price per Day of Treatment
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Average Between 1995 and 1999 Year 1995 Year 1999
Graph 6 : Relative Rate of Noncompliance and 
Advertisement toward Doctors
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